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Possible Implications of Mandating Choice in Corporate Defined Benefit Plans
Olivia S. Mitchell and Janemarie Mulvey
Abstract
Defined benefit (DB) plans have been applauded as the mainstay of the US pension
system for many years, but increasingly such plans have been replaced with defined contribution
(DC) pensions. One exception to the downward DB spiral has been the development of “hybrid”
plans. Technically, these are pensions where the benefit accrual is communicated as a lump sum
and not in the form of an annuity as is done with traditional pensions. In the transition to this
new plan structure, some employees at some firms have contended that they would have
accumulated retirement benefits more quickly under the old DB plan – assuming they remained
employed – than under the new hybrid design. In response, some legislators have attempted to
force companies transitioning from a traditional DB to a hybrid plan to offer all workers the
open-ended choice of remaining in the old DB plan, versus switching to the new hybrid plan. In
this paper we explore some of the possible consequences of mandating plan choice in this
fashion. We conclude that regulators seeking to mandate pension choice should take into
account the potential undesirable outcomes of such a law.

Possible Implications of Mandating Choice in Corporate Defined Benefit Plans
Olivia S. Mitchell and Janemarie Mulvey

Company-sponsored defined benefit (DB) plans have long been seen as the bulwark of
the US pension system, but recent years have seen a steady erosion in the number of DB plans in
America (McGill et al., forthcoming). Many of these plans have been replaced with defined
contribution (DC) plans. One interesting exception to the downward DB spiral in the last two
decades has been the invention of so-called “hybrid” defined benefit pensions. In essence, these
are pensions where the benefit accrual is communicated as a lump sum and not in the form of an
annuity as is done with traditional pensions. Many of these new hybrids were adopted by
companies that previously had offered traditional defined benefit pensions, which described
benefit provisions in terms of specific benefit formulas. In the transition process to the new
hybrid plans, a subset of employees has claimed that they would have accumulated retirement
benefits under the old plan more quickly, assuming they remained on the job, than under the new
hybrid design. Though many companies effected a smooth transition, legal challenges were filed
in some cases and still wend their way through the judicial system. Some complainants also
approached legislators, seeking to impose regulations on how companies would be permitted to
transition from a traditional DB to a hybrid plan. The thrust of such restrictions would be to
require transitioning firms to offer employees a choice of remaining in the old DB plan, or
switching to the new hybrid plan. In this paper, we offer some thoughts regarding the potential
impact of mandating plan choice in this way.
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Background and Recent Developments on Hybrid Plans
Two types of hybrids have come on the scene in the US context, namely cash balance (CB)
and pension equity plans (PEP). In a cash balance plan, the plan sponsor describes to employees
what the annual contributions will be (usually a percent of salary), indicates the interest rate
credited to annual contributions and prior accruals, and reports the lump-sum value of the
worker’s accumulation as it grows over time. In a pension equity plan, by contrast, there are no
interest credits. Instead, the benefit is defined as an accrual rate times years of service times final
average pay. What makes both of these plans “defined benefit,” in the US context, is the fact
that they promise a specified annual accrual, which means that their employer must guarantee
benefits as they accumulate. Further, in the event of company bankruptcy, the federal Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) protects the security of retirement benefits under these
plans. In contrast, DC plans are not protected by such insurance, meaning that employee benefit
accumulations vary with capital market performance.
Hybrid plans came to public attention in 1984 with the development of the Bank of
America cash balance (CB) plan. This new plan format was warmly welcomed by DB supporters
who believed that the innovative design was a means to rescue some of the essential features of
the declining traditional DB plan. In particular, supporters applauded the fact that plan sponsors
backed accumulated benefits in the hybrids, and they also believed it was important to provide
government insurance of plan accumulations in the event of company bankruptcy. Hybrid
pensions also appealed to many workers, who often felt they better understood plan accruals
when presented as an accumulation value, rather than as far-in-the-future annuity payouts
(McGill et al., forthcoming).

3
Another reason that many have favored hybrid plans is that traditional DB pensions have
imposed large benefit cuts on employees who left the firm prior to retirement age. This is
because most traditional DB formulas usually link retirement payments to final pay at the
company, so leaving the job before retirement can have a very negative effect on eventual
benefits. Turner (1993), for instance, found that two-thirds of all DB plans tied benefits to
terminal earnings rather than career formulas, a formulaic approach that imposed large pension
losses on workers who left their employers prior to the retirement age specified by the plan.
Indeed, Turner estimated that final pay plans cut retirement benefits for early leavers by almost
one-quarter. Obviously this was a problematic human resource policy in times when labor
mobility was becoming increasingly important both to workers and firms (Mitchell et al., 2003).
It is clear that hybrid plans can address the issue of portability rather well. Workers who
terminate prior to normal retirement are eligible to receive an accrued benefit in the form of a
lump sum. They then can invest the balance and earn a return on the investment up to, and
indeed after, retirement. This contrasts with traditional DB plans, where workers who leave their
employer before early retirement can claim their vested benefit only if they worked for their
employer for at least five years. Yet they do not receive the promised benefit immediately on
termination; rather, they must typically wait until normal retirement age, and therefore the
amount they receive is fixed between the termination date and retirement. In other words, the
employee who terminates with vested benefits from a traditional DB plan prior to early or
normal retirement accrues no additional market returns, nor is his benefit promise protected from
inflation, during the intervening years to normal retirement. In addition, the benefit structure of
cash balance (CB) plans also favors workers who terminate before normal retirement. The cash
balance accrual rate tends to be quite uniform across the entire work life, which differs from the
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well-known “back loaded” formulas typical of traditional DB plans which target final average
pay. In general, workers who anticipate changing jobs would benefit most from the portability
and a more uniform benefit structure of the hybrid plan.
Another reason that employers have held hybrid plans in high esteem was that the plans
encouraged older workers to remain employed beyond the early retirement age, a useful
advantage as the labor force has grown tighter over this decade (Nyce and Schieber, 2002;
Bernstein, 2003). Traditional DB plans generally encourage early retirement, by offering early
retirement subsidies and delayed retirement penalties (Luzadis and Mitchell, 1991). As a result,
DB plan sponsors seeking to keep their older workers on the job found that their traditional plans
did not serve business objectives. By contrast, hybrid plans eliminate early retirement incentives
and do not have a “spike” in accrual rates shortly before normal retirement age. Thus workers
who leave early are not penalized as was the case of most DB plans, which provided larger
accruals for longer tenured employees close to retirement. As a consequence, younger and
shorter tenured workers benefit the most from this feature of the hybrid plans.
Portability is also an important feature of a hybrid plan. The impact of portability on
benefits under a traditional DB and a hybrid may be illustrated using benefit formulas typical
under each plan design. Portability and smoother accrual patterns are increasingly relevant to
today’s workforce. Over the past 20 years, the median tenure of workers has been declining,
particularly for the older age groups. Figure 1 shows that median tenure for workers age 45- 54
has fallen from 9.5 years in 1983, to 7.6 years in 2002, for a 20% decline drop over 20 years
(BLS, 2002a). One factor driving these trends is the changing industrial distribution of the
workforce. Twenty years ago, a large share of the workforce was in manufacturing, which was
an industry characterized by long tenured employees who often stayed with one employer over
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their entire career. Today, most workers are employed in the service sector, which historically
has been characterized by shorter tenures and increased job mobility. Indeed many cash balance
conversions appear to be largely driven by labor market conditions. Coronado and Copeland
(2003) report that industries with younger, more mobile workers and tighter labor markets were
most likely to experience hybrid conversions.
Figure 1 here
To show how DB and cash balance pension wealth would be influenced by job changing,
we posit two hypothetical workers, one of whom holds three jobs over his career, and another
who remains with an employer for his entire career. Table 1 illustrates the key characteristics of
typical traditional DB and typical CB plans used for this example. The DB normal retirement
benefit, payable as an annuity from age 65, is worth 1.1 percent of his final five-year average
salary, times his years of service at termination (retirement). If the worker were to retire early,
the benefit would be reduced by 2 percent per year between ages 62 and 65, 4 percent from 60 to
62, and 5 percent for retirement from age 55 to 60. Since this formula embodies an early
retirement reduction rate that is smaller than the actuarially fair rate (which would be around 6-8
percent per year), the DB plan embodies an early retirement subsidy. By contrast, the cash
balance plan has a much smoother accrual rate, with pay credits of 4 percent per year during the
worker’s first decade of service, 5 percent for the next ten years, and 5.75 percent for service of
20 or more years. There are no early retirement reductions, and contributions are credited with a
7 percent interest credit per year.
Table 1 here
Table 2 illustrates how these two workers would fare under a traditional DB and a hybrid
plan. If a young worker knew that he would remain with a single employer his entire career and
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retire at age 65, his anticipated accumulation in the DB plan would be one-third higher than the
cash balance plan. But certainty regarding mobility prospects is unlikely since the average
American holds several jobs over his career (BLS, 2002b). In fact, using data from personnel
files from 65 large companies we found that only 7 percent of workers were likely to stay with
one employer for their entire career. Thus, when we compute the expected value of the two plans
based on the likelihood of a worker actually staying to full retirement and receiving the full
defined benefit plan the expected value of the benefit from the hybrid plan is 11 percent higher
than the expected value of the defined benefit plan (see Table 2). Beyond the expected value of
the benefit, for those employees who changed jobs three times over their work life, their pension
wealth from the hybrid plan would be nearly 18 percent higher than what they would have
received from three different DB plans.
Table 2 here
The above computations focus on the pension outcomes of workers under hybrid
conversions. There are also implications to the plan sponsor when they convert to a hybrid
pension plan. Some critics have asserted that employers undergo the conversions simply to
curtail pension expenses. If this were the only goal or even the primary goal motivating plan
changes, the most effective way to reduce pension costs is to freeze the plan or to cut back the
existing formula or early retirement subsidies. Since these plans are voluntarily sponsored by
employers, the law allows these options. The evidence, however, is far from supportive that
cost reduction is the major motivation for the shift to hybrid plans.
Most recently, Coronado and Copeland (2003) found that cash balance conversions have
not reduced overall benefit generosity at the firm level, although some redistribution may be
occurring among individual employees. This is partly because many conversions have included
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company enhancements to DC plans as well: for example, Brown et al. (2000) found that
pension costs fell by only 1 percent, on average, when firms shifted to cash balance plans. That
study also reported that 37 percent of the plan sponsors adopted changes that actually increased
pension expenditures. In some cases, longer-tenured workers might tend to lose pension wealth
under a strict conversion, inasmuch as the new hybrid plan lacks an early retirement subsidy.
One way companies have avoided this result is to grandfather many workers near retirement age.
Thus one analysis indicated that 88 percent of the cash balance conversions gave some form of
transition benefits (Clark and Schieber, forthcoming).
There are, of course, some good reasons that employers implement hybrid plans, reasons
which often fail to receive due attention. From a cost perspective, cash balance plans tend to
improve the predictability of the plan sponsor’s pension costs, largely because the rate of return
credited under cash balance (CB) plans (often called the interest credit) is tied to market rates.
Under hybrid plans the financial market risks are shared by the employer and employee. DB
plans, by contrast, promise a specific benefit formula with pay levels and service years growing
independently of plan investment returns. As a result, the traditional DB plan places substantial
investment risk on sponsors, risks that have become painfully clear during the recent market
volatility. This is clear from an examination of pension plan funding, which can be summarized
by the projected benefit security ratio (see Table 3). This is the ratio of a plan’s assets at current
market value to its projected benefit obligation. Comparing the projected security benefit ratio of
hybrid plans to traditional DB plans over the past two years shows two interesting facts. First, the
ratio is higher for hybrid plans as compared to traditional DB plans. Second, the decline in this
ratio between 2001 and 2002 is smaller for hybrids.
Table 3 here
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Another important reason that hybrid plans appeal to plan sponsors is that they are easier
to communicate to employees than are traditional DB pensions (Clark et al., 2001). Evidence
suggests that employees tend to value receiving account balance summaries and understand them
better than a benefit formula which pays an annuity commencing at normal retirement.
Regulatory and Legal Responses and Challenges
As testament to their popularity, hybrid plans are quite widespread today in the US
context. In 2000, there were over 1,200 hybrid plans comprising more than 20 percent of
corporate pension plan participants (PBGC, 2003). Virtually all of these evolved from what had
been more traditional DB plans, and most of these transitions took place in the last five years.
Yet, as noted earlier, these changes are not without controversy and there have been a number of
regulatory/legal responses and challenges to these conversions.
In considering these controversies, it should be recalled that US companies elect
voluntarily to offer pension plans. At the same time, several federal regulations and
administrative rulings have nevertheless shaped their form and structure, as well as their costs,
over time. The philosophy driving many of these regulations has derived from the fact that
pension contributions are tax-qualified as long as the funds are accumulated and paid in a
manner that accrues to a broad range of workers, rather than being limited to a subset of highly
paid employees. Perhaps the most far-reaching early US regulation was the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, which sought to change the fact that
employees could lose their pension accruals if they left their jobs before reaching retirement age
(Sass, 1997). It did so by granting workers a legal “vested” right to their accrued pensions based
on past service, and further by requiring the plans to hold assets sufficient to pay so-called
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termination benefits. Subsequent legislation again adapted and changed the pension environment
many times, resulting in additional complexities in plan administration and reporting.
The regulatory controversy regarding hybrid plans centers around two key issues: valuing
the lump sum distributions and age discrimination. The main problem in valuing the lump sum
is that “federal statutes governing these plans describe the accrued benefit in very different terms
than the plans themselves use” (Purcell, 2003). The accrued benefit under a hybrid plan is
essentially an account balance, whereas the accrued benefit under a traditional defined benefit is
described as an annuity at normal retirement age (26 USC 411(a)(7)). According to the IRS, the
employer must project the account balance of a hybrid plan forward to the plan’s normal
retirement age using the interest rate or index of rates set forth in plan documents. This amount
must then be discounted to the present using the interest rate paid by 30 year U.S. Treasury
bonds in the month prior to distribution. If the discount rate differs from the rate of return
credited toward the account, the lump sum amount could be over or understated. This regulation
has resulted in what has been termed the “whip-saw effect” where benefits are projected at the
interest crediting rate and discounted back at the mandatory lump-sum calculation rate, resulting
in a lump sum larger than the account balance in some cases. There is also a whipsaw issue with
regard to decrements used in mortality calculations along with the plan rate. Most recently, the
Burger vs. Xerox ruling was appealed and the court of appeals upheld the use of the whipsaw
calculation for determining participant’s lump sum distributions in the Xerox cash balance case.
Age discrimination issues arise because ERISA, IRS, and the Age Discrimination and
Employment Act (ADEA) all prohibit reductions in benefit accrual rates that result directly from
an employee’s advancing age (29 USC 1054(b), 26 USC 411(b)(1)(H)(i), and 29 USC 623 (i)).
Hybrid plans may be perceived as age discriminatory because interest credits compound over
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fewer years for older workers resulting in a lower benefit at retirement, as compared to younger
workers with similar starting balances. Interestingly, the same issues have not been raised about
defined contributions although their benefit accrual patterns are virtually identical to those in
hybrid plans. A number of court cases have been filed related to age discrimination, and until
recently, most have found that cash balance plans do not discriminate based on age (e.g. Onan v.
Eaton, Engrers v. AT&T, and Campbell v. Bank of Boston). Very recently, however, a ruling in
the Cooper v. IBM case found in favor of the plaintiff that IBM’s cash balance plan
discriminated on account of age. The court found that the age 65 annuity benefit could not
decrease on account of age.
Such legal challenges have, in turn, prompted legislators to leap into the fray with the
goal of mandating plan choice. According to Congressman Bernard Sanders (Ind-VT):“…there
is serious interest in our legislation that give(s) workers a choice to remain in the pension plans
they were promised, instead of being forced into a cash balance plan. It seems to me that if
companies make a promise to workers regarding the kind of pensions they will receive,
companies should have to live up to that agreement” (Sanders, 2001). In other words, the
argument is that with choice, there won’t be any question of age discrimination.
The irony is that choice has, in fact, been offered under the various hybrid plan
conversions over the past five years (Demby, 2003). There have been a number of cases where
employers offered older employees a choice between the old DB plan and the new cash balance
plan. Other employers have been even more generous and extending choice to all current
employees at the time of the conversion allowing employees to retain the “greater of” choice
option right up to retirement. Eastman Kodak began the trend in 2000 and has been followed by
Fed Ex and others. In the process, some firms have also altered their prior plans. For example,
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when FedEx gave the 137,000 employees in its old DB plan an option to stay in the old plan or
move to CB; the company amended the old plan to cap service credits at 25 years.
Mandating Choice: Cost Consequences and Potential Outcomes
While choice may appear to some to be a panacea for the pension problem, it can also
have consequences of its own. In this section we address three questions. First, what might be the
cost impact of mandating that firms transitioning to hybrid plans must also maintain their
conventional DB plans? Second, if pension costs did rise due to mandated choice, what might be
the possible results and reactions? Third, how does mandating choice fit in an environment of
voluntarily sponsored employee benefits and its impact on other forms of compensation?
While there are many different types of DB and hybrid plans that could be examined, to
simplify the analysis, we rely on the DB plan and cash balance plan structures described in Table
1, most representative of such plans. Our simulation begins by first evaluating the projected unit
cost of a typical DB and a typical CB plan given four different workforces. Personnel files from
four companies whose employment populations varied by average age, salary, and tenure were
used to conduct these simulations (see the Appendix for a more detailed description of the
methodology).
Effect of Choice on Employer Costs
Before examining the cost of mandating choice, it is instructive first to estimate the costs
of a pure conversion without any choice mandates. In the absence of any transitional benefits or
enhancements to 401(k) plans, a pure cash balance conversion would likely lower pension costs
by nearly 12 percent, relative to the typical DB plan. But these figures are misleading and
overestimate the potential reduction in costs, because they do not take account of the fact that
most plan sponsors implement transitional benefits by grandfathering workers close to
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retirement. If these transitional benefits are taken into account, much of the expected decline in
pension expense is mitigated. For example, if employees age 50+ with 10 years of tenure are
grandfathered into the traditional DB plan, pension costs fall only 4.8 percent as compared to
costs under the traditional DB plan. Additionally, if grandfathering of benefits were expanded to
middle age workers ages 40 and over with at least 10 years of tenure, pension costs under the
conversion would only decline 2.9 percent below the cost of the traditional defined benefit plan.
Even after accounting for grandfathering of benefits, these estimates may still
overestimate the potential cost differential for firms that also enhance their 401(k) plans as part
of the conversion. In an earlier analysis, 30 percent of employers increased their 401(k)
contribution by an average of 2.2 percent of payroll (Brown et al., 2000). Since we are trying to
estimate the “typical” or average conversion, we compute a weighted average “effective
contribution” rate, including both those who increased their contributions and those who did not,
under a conversion. Using this approach, we assume 401(k) employer contributions increased
0.7 percent of payroll under conversions. The bottom half of Table 4 shows the estimated change
in costs when 401(k) enhancements are taken into account. When expansion of 401(k) plans are
accounted for during a conversion, pension costs only decline by 1.6 percent compared to the
traditional defined benefit plan. This estimate is consistent with earlier research by Brown et al
(2000), who found that pension costs declined only 1.4 percent under hybrid conversions when
401(k) enhancements were included. In fact, pension costs actually increased if 401(k)
enhancements were coupled with grandfathering of benefits under the old DB plan. If plan
sponsors commit to expand their 401(k) plan during a conversion, they generally offer these
expanded benefits to all workers even those who were grandfathered under the old DB plan.
This is largely due to nondiscrimination rules, which require plan sponsors to balance their
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pension plans so as to distribute benefits among high- and low-wage workers. In this case, costs
might increase anywhere between 8.5 and 10.4 percent, depending on the nature of the
grandfathering provisions.
Table 4 here
Going beyond the cost of a pure conversion, if companies were required to allow workers
to choose between the two plans, the design of such a mandate and the employees’ response
could likely affect the ultimate costs. Choice would most likely need to be offered along with a
communications program to advise workers on how their pension benefits would differ under a
hybrid conversion versus their traditional defined benefit plan.1
In order to identify who would choose the new hybrid versus the traditional defined
benefit plan, we relied on estimates of choice probabilities derived from an analysis by Nyce
(2003) who obtained company data showing which workers chose the hybrid plan when offered
a choice. These workers were also provided access to financial planning workshops and a
financial modeling tool. These workshops and tools enabled workers to compare projections of
their future retirement benefits under various scenarios. Employees could alter their assumptions
– such as the age that they plan to retire or leave the company, the percentage increase in their
annual pay and projected interest rate – and thus estimate their expected benefits between the
two pension plan formulas. Nyce (2003) found younger workers who used the financial
modeling tool were more likely to choose the cash balance plan than those who did not use the
tool. In general, older and longer tenured workers are more likely to choose the traditional DB
plan, while shorter-tenured workers of all ages are more likely to choose the cash balance plan.
Using these estimates, employer pension costs were estimated under two choice
scenarios. The last column in Table 4 shows what the cost of choice would be over and above the
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cost of a pure conversion. The first choice scenario limits choice to workers 40+ with ten years
of tenure. Under this scenario, direct pension costs are predicted to increase 5.9 percent
compared to the cost of a cash balance conversion without choice. The second choice scenario
expands choice to workers of all ages currently employed with the firm. Under Scenario 2, when
all workers are offered choice, pension costs rise 12.9 percent above the cost of a cash balance
conversion without choice. (The cost differentials are not very different with and without 401(k)
enhancements because these enhancements are already taken into account in the initial cash
balance costs from which we are calculating the percent change.)
In addition to the costs discussed above, there is another cost issue that must be taken
into account, which can be quite important for plan sponsors. In particular, the administrative
burden of maintaining an old DB plan for a dwindling number of workers could become quite
large for a long period of time. If a firm grandfathers an old plan for a limited cohort of older
employees the cost burden will decline over time and end only after all the older workers retire.
By contrast, an ongoing and open-ended mandated choice option means that both the old and the
new pension plans could co-exist for many years – for instance, for up to 45 years if younger
workers elected to remain with the firm throughout their careers.
It is important to recognize that the administrative burden of keeping around legacy DB
plans for long periods could be large. Even though declining numbers of workers will be eligible
for the older DB plan over time, employers must still administer, value, and fund it, while
complying with a myriad of regulatory requirements. These costs fall on top of what already is
an administratively burdensome system. Administrative costs in DB plans have nearly doubled
over the past 20 years (Hustead, 1998; Mitchell, 1998). These costs would be spread over a
dwindling number of workers. For example, in our analysis, 59 percent of the workforce was age
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40 or older, and hence might possibly elect to remain in the legacy DB plan. Over time, the
share of the workforce in the legacy plan would drop to 32 percent, in five years, and to below
15 percent, in 10 years.
Mandating Choice in Environment of Voluntary Benefits and Implications for
Compensation of Workers
Employer-sponsored pensions are a voluntarily-provided benefit in the US: employers
have adopted these plans to provide tax-qualified compensation to valuable employees, to help in
selection and retention, and to encourage continued work and orderly retirement (Gustman and
Mitchell, 1992). They will continue to provide these plans as long as they meet employer and
workforce needs. Once an employer offers a pension a variety of rules specified in ERISA must
be observed. These include rules on modifying the plans. The issue of mandating choice has
arisen within the context of converting a traditional pension to a hybrid form. No one yet has
raised the issue of choice in the broader context of whether or not the plan sponsor would be able
to simply terminate or suspend the existing plan’s operations.
Under the current rules, employers can freeze benefit accruals in existing plans or can
completely terminate the plans. Indeed, there have been many more plans that have been
terminated or frozen over the past decade than have been converted to a hybrid plan form. The
PBGC reports that in 1992 it insured 71,589 private defined benefit plans (PBGC, 2002). By
2002, this number had fallen to 30,680. This decline of 41,000 plans far exceeds the 1,200 plans
that had been converted to a hybrid form by the end of 2002. In some cases, and maybe in most
of them, where private defined benefit plans have been terminated or frozen, the plan sponsor
has offered workers a defined contribution plan to replace the benefits provided in the prior plan.
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Presumably, if employers are required to offer workers the choice of either entering a
hybrid plan or staying with the old plan if the sponsor is considering a plan change, the
employers would still be able to freeze their old plan or terminate it and simply offer a defined
contribution plan in its place. If this the case, many employers considering plan modifications in
the future will simply abandon the defined benefit system altogether rather than be required to
maintain indefinitely plan formulas that no longer suit their workforces or benefits they can no
longer afford. For example, if an employer wanted to offer employees a more portable
retirement benefit through a cash balance formula that provides annual credits of 5 percent of
pay, mandatory choice might lead the employer to instead freeze its defined benefit plan and
adopt a 401(k) plan that provides contributions of 5 percent of pay. Under the 401(k) plan,
employees would bear the entire risk of stock market declines. Annuity benefits, subsidized
survivor benefits, disability benefits, and other features would no longer be available to
employees because, unlike a defined benefit plan, a 401(k) plan cannot pay these benefits.
Although the employer would prefer to provide a retirement benefit that is not subject to market
risk for the employee and that has annuity and other beneficial features, the employer would
likely switch to a 401(k) formula to avoid maintaining a traditional defined benefit formula
indefinitely.
It is unclear whether mandatory choice would be required for every change to a defined
benefit plan or merely for hybrid plan conversions. If required for every change, this would
eliminate the flexibility employers currently have and will provide an incentive to abandon the
defined benefit system. If mandatory choice is more limited and required only in the context of a
cash balance conversion, employees potentially could be subject to the worst of both worlds. An
employer could eliminate the features of a traditional plan that certain employees most value
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without providing the beneficial features found in cash balance plans. For example, if choice is
limited only to hybrid plans conversions, but not other plan changes, an employer could
eliminate prospectively early retirement subsidies in a plan without providing choice, but the
employer could not at the same time provide the more portable and more understandable cash
balance benefit without offering employees a choice to keep early retirement subsidies.
The other problem with mandating choice in a voluntary environment is the fact that
some workers will choose incorrectly. Figure 2 shows what percent of workers would choose
the cash balance plan given that they attended a financial planning workshop or used a financial
modeling tool. Not everyone, however, will correctly predict their tenure with the organization.
Some will leave when they did not expect to, and others may stay longer than they had
anticipated. The solid line in Figure 2 shows the probability of a worker leaving before they are
immediately eligible for an unreduced defined benefit pension plan. Given the expected margin
of error represented by the gap between these two lines, employee education of the sort discussed
above would be essential to protect firms against the threat of employee litigation down the line
and would provide a legal defense against those workers who may have chosen incorrectly. Of
course, plan sponsors would need to keep good records of their historical communications
material, which would be another administrative burden.
Figure 2 here
Even in some case where employers might be willing to move ahead with a hybrid plan
conversion having to offer to all workers at the point of conversion the choice which plan they
want to participate in, it is useful to remember that mandating choice is still not a “free lunch”.
Mandating choice will likely boost pension and administrative expenses, and plan sponsors may
seek to trim compensation in other areas so as to align total compensation with employee
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productivity (Mitchell and Mikalauskas, 1988). Consequently, in competitive markets, even in
this situation where choice is given, the cost of choice would not be borne by employers, but
rather it will ultimately be borne by workers. Indeed, some prior research has reported evidence
of tradeoffs between higher value pensions and lower cash wages (Montgomery et al., 1992;
Mitchell, 2000). Consequently, mandating choice that raised benefit costs could likely result in
reduced compensation. It is therefore ironic that mandated choice could make workers worse off
rather than better off.
To realign compensation with worker productivity, employers may have to resort to one
or a combination of the following: increasing employee contributions, reducing employer costs
of other benefits, reducing growth rates in wages, or curtailing wage levels. It is also possible
that some sponsoring firms would terminate their defined benefit/cash balance plans altogether.
Since terminating a defined benefit plan and/or establishing or enriching a company DC plan
does not expose firms to the legal challenges of hybrid conversions, the mandating of choice
might have the unintended consequence of leading to more DB terminations.
Conclusions
Traditional DB pensions were designed, in part, to discourage labor mobility up to a
certain age, and then to strongly encourage an orderly retirement. This pattern may have made
eminent good sense during earlier periods of labor market surplus. By contrast, many employers
today prefer hybrid plans because they smooth compensation differentials by age and soften the
incentives for early retirement. As a consequence of the new plan elements, hybrid plans are in
fact less age discriminatory than many traditional DB plans. Evidently they are useful designs
for many modern plan sponsors, as they encourage continued work and delayed retirement at
older ages.
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Nevertheless, recent court decisions are undermining company efforts to adopt cash
balance plans, and legislators now threaten to further require that firms with DB plans must
provide employees a choice between the old and new plans in perpetuity. Mandating choice
would fundamentally change the voluntary nature of the defined benefit system. As a result of
such mandates, there may be unintended and perhaps undesirable consequences. Forcing
companies to provide two plans, in the face of additional pension and administrative costs from
mandating choice, could prompt widespread plan termination which legally they would be able
to do. But many believe that DB plan terminations could make existing employees worse off. In
sum, regulators seeking to mandate pension choice should take into account the potential
undesirable outcomes of their proposals.
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Figure 1. Median Years of Tenure with Current Employer
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2002a)
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Figure 2. Choice of Cash Balance Plan In An Imperfect World
Source: Authors’ calculations of probability based for the perfect knowledge based on personnel
files for a sample of large employers. Probabilities of choice with financial planning advice
derived from Nyce (2003).
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Table 1. Benefit Formulas for DB and Cash Balance Plan Simulations
Benefit Formula
Traditional DB Plan

1.1 % of final 5-year
average pay times
service

CB Plan

Pay credits of 4% for
first 10 years of
service, 5% for next
10 year, 5.75% for 20
or more years of
service

Early Retirement
Reductions
Reduced 2% per year
from age 65 to 62, 4%
per year from 62 to 60
and 5% per year from
60 to 55
None

Source: Derived for authors from Watson Wyatt 2002/2003 COMPARISON Database

Table 2. Comparison of Retirement Benefits Under Hybrid and Defined Benefit Plans
Lump Sum Value

Works for same
employer for
entire career
Works for three
different
employers and
vests in each
pension plan
Expected Value
of Each Plan

Hybrid Plan
$251,559

Traditional DB
Plan
$369,378

% Difference:
Hybrid vs DB
Plan
-31.8 %

$211,756

$179,932

17.6%

$214,542

$193,192

11%

Source: Computations represent typical cash balance and DB plan as specified in Table 1.
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Table 3. Average Projected Benefit Security Ratio
2001

2002

% change

Traditional DB Plans

0.89

0.66

-26%

Cash Balance Plans

1.0

0.80

-20%

Pension Equity Plans

0.88

0.71

-19%

Source: Authors’ calculations from disclosure statements of U.S. corporations DB pension plans
annual reports filed under FASB 87 and 106.

27

Table 4. Summary of Results under Alternative Conversion Patterns
Change in Projected Unit Costs of Pension Plans
% Change in From

% Change from

Typical DB

Typical CB

WITHOUT 401(k) ENHANCEMENTS
Straight Conversion
-11.6%
Grandfathering Benefits
For: Workers 50+
With 10 Years of Service

0%

-4.8

7.8

-2.9

9.9

Choice To Workers Age
40+ with 10 Years of
Tenure

-6.4

5.9

Choice To All Workers

-0.3

12.9

Workers 40+
With 10 Years of Service
Choice Options:

WITH 401(k) ENHANCEMENTS
Straight Conversion
-1.6 %
Grandfathering Benefits
For: Workers 50+
With 10 Years of Service

0%

8.5

6.8

10.4

8.6

Choice To Workers Age
40+ with 10 Years of
Tenure

6.9

5.2

Choice To All Workers

13.0

11.2

Workers 40+
With 10 Years of Service
Choice Options:

Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Appendix
To compute the projected unit cost for the DB and CB plans in our analysis, we used the
following methodology:
For the traditional DB plans, the projected unit credit normal cost method is used. Under this
method, the present value of benefits accrued this year, taking into account expected future pay
increases, produces the annual plan cost. These calculations use assumptions similar to the
valuation assumptions for the four companies defined benefit plans.
To assess the value of benefits under the cash balance plan, we must specify the interest rate
credits applied to participant balances. For our analysis we assume a 7 percent annual interest
rate credit.
Other assumptions used include the following:
Valuation interest rate
7.00%
Annual salary increase
5.00
Social Security wage base increase 4.50
CPI increase
4.00
Representative turnover decrement rates
At age 20
22.5%
At age 35
7.5
At age 50
1.5
Mortality is assumed to occur at the rates in the unisex version of the 1994 Group Annuity
Mortality Table. The value of termination benefits at all ages after vesting and prior to early
retirement age is added to the value of retirement benefits to produce the total defined benefit
values for all plans.
Table A1 shows the demographic characteristics of the workforces in the firms used for the
analysis.
Table A1. Simulated Firms Used for Analysis

Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D

Average
Age
43.9
39.8
42.7
35.9

Average
Tenure
11.1
9.8
12.6
6.8

Median
Salary
$41,520
$38,456
$54,935
$32,287

Size

Industry

7,000
12,000
9,000
15,000+

Durable Mfg
Telecom
Non-durable Mfg
Wholesale/Retail
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Endnotes
1

Here we do not abstract from the possibility that workers might be permitted “buy back” their
DB plans with their CB contributions. In a related analysis, Lachance et al. (2002) show that
offering workers an open-ended chance to buy-back DB benefits could be quite expensive.

